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18-8304 should be
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Richard Yeoman is appealing from his judgment of conviction for failing to
register as a sex offender.

Yeoman alleges that the district court erred in

denying his motion to dismiss the charge.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinas
In 1984, Yeoman was convicted of Rape in the State of Washington. (R.,
p. 25; PSI, p. 3.) Yeoman moved to ldaho in 2007. (R. p. 26.) Yeoman was not
on probation or parole, but was required to register as a sex offender in
Washington as of the date he moved to ldaho. (R., pp. 12, 26-27; Appellant's
brief, p. 2.) ldaho charged Yeoman by information with failure to register as a
sex offender and a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp. 24-25, 61-62.)
Yeoman filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the terms of the sex offender
registry statute did not apply to him. (R., pp. 26-33.) After a hearing, the district
court denied the motion. (R., p. 47.) Yeoman entered a conditional plea of
guilty, resewing the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss and
pursuant to a plea agreement, the persistent violator enhancement was
dismissed. (R., pp. 64-65, 77-78.) Yeoman was sentenced to five years, with
three fixed. (R., pp. 87-89.) Yeoman filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 9092.)

ISSUES
Mr. Yeoman states the issue on appeal as:
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Yeoman's Motion to Dismiss
Information?
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1. Has Yeoman failed to show he was entitled to dismissal where the plain
language of ldaho Code § 18-8304 requires Yeoman to register as a sex
offender?
2. Has Yeoman failed to demonstrate that ldaho Code
unconstitutional?

18-8304 is

(1996). The court assumes that the legislature meant what is clearly stated in
the statute, unless the result is "palpably absurd." Schwartz, 139 ldaho at 362,
79 P.3d at 721;

w,133 ldaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688,

Thus, this Court must first determine if the statute is plain and
unambiguous. If not, the Court must then resort to legislative history and rules of
statutory interpretation to determine legislative intent. Finally, only if the statute
still remains ambiguous will the Court apply the rule of lenity and resolve the
remaining ambiguity in favor of the defendant. State v. Beard, 135 ldaho 641,
646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001). The statute in this case is clear. ldaho
Code § 18-8304(1) reads in relevant part:
(1) The provisions of this chapter shall apply to any person who:
(a) On or after July 1, 1993, is convicted of the crime, or an
attempt, a solicitation, or a conspiracy to commit a crime provided
for in section 18-909 (assault with attempt to commit rape,
infamous crime against nature, or lewd and lascivious conduct with
a minor, but excluding mayhem, murder or robbery), 18-911
(battery with attempt to commit rape, infamous crime against
nature, or lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor, but excluding
mayhem, murder or robbery), 18-1506 (sexual abuse of a child
under sixteen years of age), 18-1506A (ritualized abuse of a child),
18-1507 (sexual exploitation of a child), 18-1507A (possession of
sexually exploitative material for other than a commercial purpose),
18-1508 (lewd conduct with a minor child), 18-1508A (sexual
battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age), 181509A (enticing a child over the internet), 18-4003(d) (murder
committed in perpetration of rape), 18-4116 (indecent exposure,
but excluding a misdemeanor conviction), 18-4502 (first degree
kidnapping committed for the purpose of rape, committing the
infamous crime against nature or for committing any lewd and
lascivious act upon any child under the age of sixteen, or for
purposes of sexual gratification or arousal), 18-4503 (second
degree kidnapping where the victim is an unrelated minor child),
18-6101 (rape, but excluding 18-6101 1. where the defendant is
eighteen years of age or younger or where the defendant is
exempted under subsection (4) of this section), 18-6108 (male

rape), 18- 6110 (sexual contact with a prisoner), 18-6602 (incest),
18-6605 (crime against nature), 18-6608 (forcible sexual
penetration by use of a foreign object), or upon a second or
subsequent conviction under 18-6609, ldaho Code (video
voyeurism).
(b) On or after July I , 1993, has been convicted of any crime, an
attempt, a solicitation or a conspiracy to commit a crime in another
state, territory, commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of the United
States, including tribal courts and military courts, that is
substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection (l)(a) of
this section and enters the state to establish permanent or
temporary residence.
(c) Has been convicted of any crime, an attempt, a solicitation or a
conspiracy to commit a crime in another state, territory,
commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of the United States, including
tribal courts and military courts, that is substantially equivalent to
the offenses listed in subsection (l)(a) of this section and was
required to register as a sex offender in any other state or
jurisdiction when he established permanent or temporary residency
in ldaho.

I.C. $j18-8304(1)
Yeoman claims that the statute should be interpreted in a way inconsistent
with his guilt.

Specifically, he argues that he had no duty to register under

subsection (l)(c) because the underlying sex offense for which he was convicted
in another state occurred before July 1, 1993 and that "an offense which is
substantially equivalent 'to the offenses listed in subsection (l)(a)' can only be an
offense committed on or before [sic] [after] July 1, 1993." (Appellant's brief, pp.
7-8.) Yeoman's proposed interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the
statute.
Here the plain language of the statute incorporates the "offenses listed in
subsection (l)(a)." The offenses listed have no date restriction. See, e.g., State
v. Coleman, 128 ldaho 466, 471, 915 P.2d 28, 33 (Ct. App. 1996) (time not a

material element of lewd conduct). If the legislature intended to include the date
restriction of subsection (l)(a) it would have said so; by limiting the incorporation
of that subsection to the "offenses listed" the plain language does not incorporate
any date limitation. Here the plain language of subsection (l)(c) requires a sex
offender convicted in a foreign jurisdiction to register in ldaho if they were
required to register in the foreign jurisdiction when they moved to ldaho.
Even if the language were not plain, Yeoman's proposed interpretation
leaves the statute internally inconsistent and renders language of the statute a
nullity.

See

Belt v. Belt, 106 ldaho 426, 431, 679 P.2d 1144, 1149 (1984)

(construction of a statute should be adopted which does not deprive provisions of
the statute of their meaning). Inexplicably, Yeoman fails to even mention
subsection (l)(b) and says that subsection (l)(c) is the "only section that involved
foreign convictions." (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) Clearly, both subsections (b) and
(c) involve foreign convictions. Yeoman's error on this point contributes to his
faulty logic and results in a conclusion directly contrary to the rules of statutory
interpretation. ldaho Code § 18-8304 has two subsections that apply to persons
with convictions in other jurisdictions.

Both have the same "substantially

equivalent" language incorporating the offenses of subsection l(a). I.C. § 188304(1)(b) and (l)(c). Subsection (l)(b), however, specifically includes the "on
or after July 1, 1993" language, while subsection (l)(c) does not. Interpreting
subsection (l)(c) to include the date restriction, as Yeoman would have this
court do, makes the date restriction in subsection (l)(b) superfluous and

redundant.

This interpretation is thus contrary to the rules of statutory

interpretation.
The plain language of the statute requires Yeoman to register. Therefore,
Yeoman has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss.

II.
Yeoman Has Failed To Establish That ldaho Code 5 18-8304 Is Unconstitutional
A.

Introduction
Yeoman was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender under I.C. §

18-8307, which applies to those persons identified in I.C. § 18-8304. He appeals
the denial of his motion to dismiss and alleges that I.C. § 18-8304 violates both
the Privileges and Immunities Clause (right to travel) and the Equal Protection
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Yeoman has failed to demonstrate any

constitutional violation.
B.

Standard Of Review
Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the appellate court

reviews it de novo. State v. Suiter, 138 ldaho 13, 15, 56 P.3d 775, 777 (2002);
State v. Cobb, 132 ldaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998). The party
challenging the constitutionality of a statute must overcome a strong presumption
of constitutionality and clearly show the invalidity of the statute.
Richards, 127 ldaho 31,34,896 P.2d 357,360 (Ct. App. 1995).

State v.

"It is hornbook law that legislative enactments are presumed constitutional
and that appellate courts are obligated to seek an interpretation of the statute
which upholds its constitutionality." State v. Newman, 108 ldaho 5, 13 n.12, 696
P.2d 856, 864 n.12 (1985); State v. Dickerson, 142 ldaho 514, 518, 129 P.3d
1263, 1267 (Ct. App. 2006).
C.

Yeoman Has Failed To Establish That ldaho Code 5 18-8304
Unreasonablv Burdens His Right To Travel In Violation Of The Privileqes
And Immunities Clause Of The U.S. Constitution
The right to travel from one state to another is a fundamental right derived

from the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment and one of its
components is the right of those travelers who choose to become permanent
residents to be treated like other citizens of the state.

Saenz 526 U.S.

489, 501 (1999); Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir.1999). "A statute
that unreasonably burdens the right to travel is subject to strict scrutiny and will
be struck down as unconstitutional 'unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest.' However, when the right to travel is implicated
but not unreasonably burdened, the statute need only be rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest to pass constitutional muster." U.S. v. Burkey,
2009 WL 1616564, 28 (D.Nev., 2009) (citing Memorial How. v. Marico~a
County, 415 U.S. 250, 262 (1974); Walsh v. City and Countv of Honolulu, 423
F.Supp.2d 1094, 1102-1104 (D.Haw., 2006) (citing Martinez v. Bvnum, 461 U.S.
84, 87 (1983)).)
Yeoman claims that there is "disparate treatment" between out-of-state
and in-state sex offenders. (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) He relies on a case in

which it was held to be a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to deny newly-arrived residents the same welfare
benefits as established residents. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-12 (citing Saenz v.
Roe,
-

526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999)).)

The court in Saenz held that it was

unconstitutional to deprive a new resident of the same welfare benefits as an
established resident based on a one year residency requirement unless such
deprivation was based on a "compelling" governmental interest.
at 502.

m,526 U.S.

Yeoman's case is distinguishable from Saenz because it does not

involve a durational residency requirement and he has failed to demonstrate that
he was deprived of any benefits of state citizenship by virtue of the sex offender
registration requirement.
It is more instructive to look at an ldaho Court of Appeals case where the
court found unconstitutional a provision of the (since amended) sex offender
registration act that required sex offenders convicted in other jurisdictions to
register if they entered the state after July 1, 1993. State v. Dickerson, 142
ldaho 514, 518-19, 129 P.3d 1263, 1267-68 (Ct. App. 2006). The court stated
that the "right to travel" was burdened by statutes that either "penalize migration
or create fixed, permanent distinctions among citizens" based upon time of entry
into the state. @., 142 ldaho at 519, 129 P.3d at 1268. The court's analysis of
why the statute violated the "right to travel" was as follows:
In this case, I.C. § 18-8304 (l)(b) has elements of both types of
classifications. It penalizes persons with pre-1993 convictions who
moved to the state after 1993 by requiring registration when it is not
required of like offenders who are longer-term residents, and it
created fixed, permanent distinctions between sex offenders based
solely upon the date when they established residency in ldaho.

Id. at 519-20, 129 P.3d at 1268-69. Thus, the fundamental problem with the
statute was that it treated persons differently based upon when they came to the
state.
Application of this standard shows that the statutory provision here at
issue neither penalizes migration nor creates permanent distinctions among
residents because it does not vary in its application by when the person in
question enters the state. On the contrary, the statute draws distinctions based
on where fhe person was convicted, not when he entered the state. The Sexual
Offender Registration Act applies to "any person who":
Has been convicted of any crime, an attempt, a solicitation or a
conspiracy to commit a crime in another state, territory,
commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of the United States, including
tribal courts and military court, that is substantially equivalent to the
offenses listed in subsection (l)(a) of this section and was required
to register as a sex offender in any other state or jurisdiction when
he established permanent or temporary residency in ldaho.
I.C. § 18-8304 (l)(c). Thus, a person has a duty to register in ldaho under this
subsection if two criteria are met. First, the person had to be convicted of a
qualifying offense in a jurisdiction other than ldaho, and the person had to have
been required to register as a sex offender in another jurisdiction when he
established residency in ldaho.
Yeoman argues that the provision of the sex offender registration act
currently at issue burdens the right to travel because "the statute in question
clearly treats an in-state sex offender differently than it would a similarly situated
out-of-state sex offender." (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) He has failed to show,
however, that the statute in fact does so. Unlike the statute struck down in

Dickerson, the current statute does not differentiate based upon date of entry
into the state, but is instead based upon whether the conviction was in ldaho or
out of ldaho. His argument relies in part on the faulty premise that Yeoman, a
Washington resident who committed a crime in Washington, should be
compared to an ldaho resident who committed a crime in ldaho. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 12-13.) This is simply incorrect. The correct comparison is to compare
Yeoman with an ldaho resident who committed a crime in Washington.

See

People v. McGarahan, 18 Misc.3d 811, 815, 852 N.Y.S.2d 615, 619 (N.Y. Supp.
2007).
The statute would apply the same to a life-long resident of Washington
moving to ldaho after release from prison for a conviction of a sex offense in
Washington, and to a life-long resident of ldaho establishing a permanent
residence back in ldaho after release from prison for a conviction of a sex
offense in Washington. Unlike in Dickerson, registration is not premised upon
the date the defendant entered the state, but rather whether the defendant had
to register in a foreign jurisdiction when he entered ldaho. The only time the
statute would conceivably treat persons differently based upon residency
appears to be if an ldaho citizen is not required to establish a "permanent or
temporary residency in Idaho" following a conviction requiring registration in
another state.

The statute, however, defines "residence" as "the offender's

present place of abode." I.C. § 18-8303(13). Thus, it appears from the statute
that the only time an ldaho citizen convicted in another jurisdiction (and subject
to registration there) would avoid the registration requirements under I.C. § 18-

8304(1)(c) would be when that person is not incarcerated for the sex offense and
therefore did not change his place of abode.

Yeoman has failed to show

disparate treatment.
Furthermore, Yeoman has not shown that his travel rights were infringed.
Yeoman was convicted of rape, spent some time in prison before being released
on parole, and was required to register as a sex offender in Washington when he
moved to ldaho. (PSI pp. 3, 7; R., pp. 12, 26-27; Appellant's brief, p. 2.) If
Yeoman had been an ldaho resident his entire life except for the time he spent in
a Washington prison he would still have been required to register upon entering
ldaho under subsection (l)(c) by virtue of his Washington conviction and his
obligation to register as a sex offender in that state. He has been treated,
therefore, the same way as any other ldaho resident would have been under
similar circumstances. A comparison could also be made between an ldaho
resident who was required to register as a sex offender who moved within the
state. As a court found under the federal sex offender registry, "the essential
part of the charged crime in this matter is the failure to register; the Defendant's
right to travel is incidental to this obligation, and not necessarily affected. Such
registration requirements place no greater burden on an interstate traveler than
upon a convicted sex offender who travels to a different city within his home
state, in a state where such a move triggers a re-registration or updating
requirement."

U.S. v. Clayton, 2009 WL 1033664, 18-19 (W.D.Pa., 2009).

Under either comparison, Yeoman has failed to demonstrate that the burden of
registering (or re-registering) upon moving is unreasonable.

Yeoman has not carried his burden of showing unconstitutionality because
he has failed to show that the constitutional right to travel prohibits the state of
ldaho from differentiating between sex offenders (for purposes of registration)
based upon jurisdiction of conviction.

See

People v. McGarahan, 18 Misc.3d

811, 852 N.Y.S.2d 615 (N.Y. Supp. 2007) (requiring registration on basis of outof-state requirement of registration does not treat new state residents different
from long-term state residents). Even more importantly, he has failed to show
that the statute treated him any differently based upon when he came to ldaho.
Because he has failed to show that the statute violated his right to travel, he has
failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
Even if there were disparate treatment, Yeoman has failed to show that
the registration requirement is an unreasonable burden subject to strict scrutiny.
The "constitutional right of interstate travel is certainly not an absolute right."
U.S. v. Clavton, 2009 WL 1033664, 19 (W.D.Pa., 2009). In Clavton, the court

found that the federal sex offender registration law did not violate the right to
travel, explaining that:
It is true that upon traveling to a new state, Defendant must register
in the new state, while a convicted sex offender who remains within
in [sic] a state need only remain properly registered. However, the
Court fails to see a constitutional violation in this distinction. Where
a person moves to a new state, he needs to obtain a new driver's
license and vehicle registration: frankly, this licensing process can
be an irritating hassle; however, the motor vehicle and licensing
requirements certainly do not unduly infringe upon anyone's right to
travel. Furthermore, signing up for utilities in some parts of this
country is an exercise in frustration. Essentially, seemingly
innumerable administrative requirements place burdens upon those
who move. Yet following Defendant's line of reasoning, this Court
should strike down these pesky local administrative burdens,
because they are an impediment to moving. . . the Court does not

mean to minimize the substantial stigma that accrues from
compliance with registration requirements. Nonetheless, such laws
were appropriately passed by the legislative branch, and cannot be
invalidated absent a showing of a specific constitutional violation.
Id.
The Court in Clavton found that the burden imposed upon Defendant's
right to travel was not unreasonable, but was necessary to achieve a compelling
interest, stating that, "obviously, all sex offender registration requirements are
burdensome, and the consequences of such lists interfere greatly with a
registrant's freedom to work and to participate in society; however, society,
through its legislative processes, has decided again and again that it has a
compelling and strong interest in preventing future sex crimes." Clayton, 2009
WL 1033664, 18 -19 (W.D.Pa., 2009).
Similarly, the U.S. District Court in Nevada noted that "sex offenders
traveling from state to state may still do so freely without first seeking permission
from authorities" and held that the inconvenience of updating one's registration
upon traveling interstate is justified in light of the purpose behind the registration
requirements. U.S. v. Burkey, 2009 WL 1616564, 28 (D.Nev., 2009). "The state
has a strong interest in preventing future sexual offenses and alerting local law
enforcement and citizens to the whereabouts of those that could reoffend.
Without such a requirement, sex offenders could legally subvert the purpose of
the statute by temporarily traveling to other jurisdictions for long periods of time
and committing sex offenses without having to notify law enforcement." U.S. v.
Burkey, 2009 WL 1616564, 28 (D.Nev., 2009)(citing Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d

1337, 1349 (I lfh.
Cir. 2005))

Even if the statute did burden his right to travel, and were subject to strict
scrutiny, it does not violate the constitution if, pursuant to strict scrutiny,' the
distinction drawn by the statute furthers a legitimate state purpose. Dickerson,
142 ldaho 514, 520, 129 P.3d 1263, 1269. Yeoman's total argument on this
point is that, "The State has set forth no compelling governmental reason for the
disparate treatment." (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) Pointing out that the state has
not done something is not sufficient to carry Yeoman's burden of proof. The
state requests that the Court reject Yeoman's challenge to the statute because
he has not carried his burden.

See I.A.R. 35;

State v. Zichko, 129 ldaho 259,

263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either
authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking.")
If the court reaches the question of a legitimate state purpose, review
shows that the statute passes constitutional muster. The governmental interest
in preventing sex abuse and in knowing the location of sex offenders is
compelling.

See Connecticut Dep't of Public Safetv v. Doe, 538 U.S. I , 4 (2003)

(sex offenders are a serious threat and are "much more likely than any other type
of offender to be re-arrested for a new rape or sexual assault"). The risk of
recidivism is "frightening and high" and often occurs in a different state. Smith v.
Doe,
-

538 U.S. 84, 103-04 (2003) (internal quotation omitted.) Allowing sex

' The Dickerson court noted that a lesser standard of review (such as rational
basis) might apply if a statute was deemed to not infringe on migration but
instead created permanent distinctions based upon time of entry into the state.
Dickerson, 142 ldaho at 520, 129 P.3d at 1270. The state submits that the
statute survives strict scrutiny, and therefore would also pass muster under a
lesser standard. Nevertheless, this Court should apply the correct standards of
review.

offenders to avoid registration by simply coming to ldaho would also subvert the
purpose of sex offender registration laws in existence in other states. Thus,
requiring those already subject to another state's registration requirements to
register upon coming to ldaho constitutionally furthers a governmental interest.
see Miller
-

v. State, 971 So.2d 951, 954 (Fla. App. 2007) (upholding statute

requiring persons required to register as sex offenders in another state to register
in Florida if they establish or maintain a residence in Florida); P e o ~ l ev.
McGarahan, 18 Misc.3d 811, 814, 852 N.Y.S.2d 615, 619 (N.Y. Supp. 2007)
("States have a legitimate interest in requiring offenders who commit registerable
offenses in other jurisdictions to register in their new state of residence.
[Otherwise] an offender could avoid sex offender registration requirements
simply by moving his state of residence, thereby frustrating the purpose behind
sex offender registration laws.") ldaho has a compelling interest in preventing
sex offenders from avoiding registration laws by moving to Idaho. Thus, the
statute survives strict scrutiny.
Yeoman has failed to show that the requirement that he register in ldaho
violated his right to travel as guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the Constitution and consequently, he has failed to show that the district court
erred in denying his motion to dismiss.

D.

Yeoman Has Failed To Establish That ldaho Code S 18-8304 Violates
The Eaual Protection Clause Of The U.S. Constitution
Yeoman also argues that requiring him to register violates the Equal

Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution under a rational review standard.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 13-17.)
The Equal Protection Clause embraces the principle that all persons in
like circumstances should receive the same benefits and burdens of law. Equal
protection issues focus upon classifications within statutory schemes that
allocate benefits or burdens differently among the categories of persons affected.
State v. Reed, 107 ldaho 162, 167-168, 686 P.2d 842, 847-848 (Ct. App. 1984).

A classification satisfies equal protection under the rational basis standard if it is
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose and if any conceivable set
of facts would support it. State v. Mowrey, 134 ldaho 751, 755, 9 P.3d 1217,
1221 (2000); State v. Bowman, 104 ldaho 39, 41, 655 P.2d 933, 935 (1982).
Equal protection does not require that all persons be treated alike, but only that
similarly situated persons be treated alike.
Yeoman argues that Doe v. McVey, 381 F.Supp.2d 443, 449 (E.D. Pa.
2005), affd Doe v. Pennsvlvania Board of Probation and Parole, 513 F.3d 95,
107-11 (3d Cir. 2008), is "directly on point." (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-16.) Even
a cursory glance at that case, however, shows that it has almost no relationship
to this case. First, Doe did not even challenge his obligation to register in
Pennsylvania based upon his New Jersey conviction.

Doe, 513 F.3d at 107.

He

challenged only the community notification provisions that required flyers
announcing his violent predator sex offender status be passed around in his

neighborhood.

u

The basis of his challenge was that persons on parole in

Pennsylvania who were convicted within the state were subject to community
notification only if they were adjudicated to be a "sexually violent predator" in a
civil hearing while persons on parole in Pennsylvania who were convicted outside
of the state were automatically subject to community notification requirements.
Id. at 98.'
-

The court determined that protection from sex offenders was a

legitimate governmental interest, and phrased the question presented as
"whether the Commonwealth's denial of equivalent process to both in-state and
out-of state parolees is rationally related to its security concerns."

!& at 108.

The court ultimately held that there was no rational basis for treating parolees
convicted in-state so differently than those convicted out-of-state.

Id.at 107-11.

This case is significantly different. Unlike Doe, Yeoman is challenging his
duty to register - not a classification as being a "sexually violent predator" subject
to community notification. Likewise, ldaho sex offenders are not provided extra
process not provided to out-of-state sex offenders in ldaho, as was the case in
Doe. Thus, the analysis of whether these vastly different statutory provisions are
rationally related to a legitimate state interest is of minimal utility in this case.
In this case, the state has not only the legitimate interest of protecting the
community from sex offenders, but the legitimate interest in preventing sex
offenders subject to

registration elsewhere avoiding those

registration

requirements by coming to ldaho, and the legitimate interest in preventing this

The statute governing Idaho's procedure for declaring someone a violent sexual
predator is found at I.C. § 18-8314. Nothing in the record indicates that such a
designation was at issue in this case.
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interest in preventing this subversion of those states' registration requirements.
Protection of these interests is rationally related to requiring those already
mandated to register in another state to also register when they come to Idaho.
Miller v. State, 971 So.2d 951, 954 (Fla. App. 2007); People v. McGarahan, 18
Misc.3d 811, 852 N.Y.S.2d 615 (N.Y. Supp. 2007).
Yeoman has failed to carry his burden of showing the statute is
unconstitutional. He has therefore necessarily failed to show error in the denial
of his motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
denial of Yeoman's motion to dismiss.
DATED this 17th day of July 2009.
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